SUMMARY: This paper describes how complex political struggles in
collapsing or making staff redundant. Despite the establishment of an export promotion zone, which has attracted some foreign and domestic investment and in which about 3,000 people are employed, industry is restricted by severe water shortages, frequent power failures, a shortage of serviced industrial land and high levels of crime and insecurity. (5) Despite these difficulties, a long-established local business class continues to invest in tourism, commerce, manufacturing and property. The jobs available have attracted permanent and temporary migrants from both the rest of the Coast province and "up-country" for decades. According to the census, Mombasa's population in 1989 was 462,000, representing a growth of about 3 per cent per annum since 1969. Today, it is thought to be between 600,000 and 700,000, with a population profile which continues to show an excess of men over women (a ratio of 125:100). (6) In 1979, 53 per cent of the labour force (all those aged 20-64) were working in the "formal" sector. Following a decline in the 1980s, in the 1990s, despite the economic problems described above, total formal sector employment apparently grew by just under 2 per cent per annum, consistently employing around 45 per cent of the labour force. Of these, 30 per cent were in manufacturing, 19 per cent in the wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, 29 per cent in transport and communications, and most of the rest in other services. (7) The largest single employer is the port, with a workforce of 7,000 at the end of 1998 (down from 12,000 in 1986 as a result of a restructuring programme). (8) Business and political allies (especially Asian owned businesses in the textiles and clothing sector) favoured liberalization and casualization of labour. (9) Nevertheless, although there has been manufacturing investment, especially in agroprocessing, there have been also, as noted above, post-liberalization closures, and employment in all sub-sectors except services has stagnated. It was estimated that, in urban areas nationally, 32 per cent in 1988 and 38 per cent in 1993 were working in the informal sector, an apparent increase since the estimate of 21 per cent based on the 1986 urban labour force survey. (10) Figures are not available for Mombasa but, in the Coast province as a whole, informal sector employment is estimated to have increased by just under 13 per cent per annum between 1989 and 1997. (11) In 1996, in the city as a whole, 19 per cent of household heads and 46 per cent of the labour force were women; 97 per cent of male and 76 per cent of female household heads were working in paid employment. Of working men, almost half had jobs or businesses in the formal sector, 12 per cent were casual labourers and the remainder had their own businesses (16 per cent) or were wage workers in the informal sector (25 per cent). (12) Jobs in the formal sector have always favoured men, who have been able to get work as loaders at the port, in the coffee-exporting godowns, as watchmen, factory hands and in the transport industry. Women continue to be under-represented. (13) Although their participation in the economy has increased in recent years, they continue to be disproportionately concentrated in the informal sector (56 per cent compared to 41 per cent of men) and, even in this sector, the more lucrative activities, such as the hawking of curios, manufacturing, renting out rooms and water vending, are dominated by men. Women are engaged mainly in selling foodstuffs, also in brewing and selling illicit liquor, and in prostitution.
All those who engage in informal sector activities face problems, including lack of access to credit; cumbersome and bureaucratic licensing requirements; "taxation" in the form of bribes demanded by the police and council askaris from those operating without licences or in nonpermitted locations, especially the central business district; regulatory restrictions; and lack of appropriate sites and premises.
III. POVERTY IN MOMBASA
DATA ON THE incidence of poverty in Mombasa are only available for 1992 and 1994. They indicate that about a quarter of households and a third of individuals fall below an absolute poverty line. (14) Despite the economic problems of the 1980s and 1990s, therefore, it has still been possible for many to obtain either formal sector jobs (especially in the services sector) or access to informal sector economic opportunities, maintaining their incomes above the poverty level. A participatory poverty assessment (PPA) in 1997 revealed that poor residents defined poverty as a state of living from hand to mouth, characterized by lack of money, leading to an inability to meet daily needs for food, shelter and education (hali ambayo mtu hajiwezi in Kiswahili). They also stressed that poor families had multiple problems and felt powerless and unable to improve their situation. (15) Women, especially household heads, children and young people were considered to be particularly disadvantaged. Women household heads were thought to be vulnerable because they have, in the past, had poorer access to education and have, as a result, lower literacy levels. In addition, they own limited productive assets, especially land, and so have even more limited access to credit than men. Further, they tend to be ignorant of their rights and thus exploited and discriminated against in economic activities, both in wage employment and business enterprises. Economic hardships are said to be associated with many social problems, including domestic violence, resulting in more frequent divorce and a perceived increase in the numbers of female headed households. (16) The lack of opportunities for young people was of particular concern to poor people, who consider that the youth "...see no real chance for participation in the development of this country. In spite of their education and energy, they are helpless, frustrated and dangerous." (17) Rates of unemployment are high amongst young people because they lack practical training, exposure to the world of work and business, and access to credit, as well as information on employment, markets for their products, training opportunities and where to go for assistance. Some young people 14. See reference 11 for household expenditure necessary to afford a minimum nutritionally adequate diet and essential non-food expenditure items, adjusted for household size and age structure. Considerable World Bank assistance has been given to Kenya to develop its income poverty measures and to carry out and analyse successive welfare monitoring surveys, so the poverty line measure of income poverty is considered reasonably reliable. The situation of poor people and large numbers of the non-poor is exacerbated by the low levels of utility and service provision in the city, see below.
are said to have a negative attitude towards some types of work, especially informal sector activities. Instead, they aspire to regular wage employment, despite the lack of opportunities. Moreover, it was asserted by participants in the PPA that, due to the breakdown of traditional upbringing processes, a lack of role models, idleness and loose morals, young people had been hardest hit by the AIDS epidemic and drug abuse. (18) There were estimated to be 5,000 "street children" in Mombasa in 1994. (19) The participatory poverty assessment also revealed aspects of the coping strategies of poor and very poor households in Mombasa. Not surprisingly, these focus on income generation and include: (20) income-generating activities; q the entry of non-earning household members into informal sector income-generating activities as well as wage earners taking up supplementary activities; q the conversion of a kitchen into a bedroom, adding an outhouse or covering a courtyard to provide an extra room; q urban agriculture; q boys and young people becoming "beach boys" or "tour guides", undertaking casual work such as porters in markets, or engaging in criminal activities; expenditure-saving activities; q walking to work; q reducing the amount of food consumed/eating once a day; q gathering fallen items from market stalls to eat or sell; q withdrawing children from school, temporarily or permanently; q using self-medication or herbal medicines, postponing medical treatment; credit; q membership of a rotating credit association ("merry-go-round"); q borrowing from relatives or neighbours to pay for health care; q seeking credit from shopkeepers; q becoming permanently indebted, avoiding those to whom money is owed; asking for assistance when very poor or suddenly impoverished; q seeking material and financial assistance from relatives or friends, which is not regarded as begging; q begging for money or food at religious buildings.
Ties to the rural areas are important in household strategies; many of the men in Mombasa are temporary migrants who may return home either to invest in a business or when work is not available. (21) Many households have rights to rural land and transfers of people, money and food go in both directions. When ranked, by far the most important factor pushing people into poverty was said to be the inability to access adequate income-generating activities, including employment. However, large family size, divorce or bereavement, landlessness, lack of education, nepotism and insecurity were also significant factors. (22) In many respects, the characteristics and causes of poverty identified by PPA participants in Mombasa were similar to those identified by respondents in rural areas in Kenya but issues of ethnicity and insecurity were identified as looming particularly large compared to many rural areas.
Mombasa has a mixed population; it has attracted Arab and Asian traders for centuries and the British imported Asian labour to work on railway construction in the early years of this century. In 1969, Arabs made up 6 per cent of the population, had played a privileged role in adminis- Coastal Africans are found in all occupations but are disproportionately concentrated in unskilled and casual jobs because of their low educational levels. Up-country groups gained an early foothold in the large-scale formal sector because of their willingness to take up unskilled manual jobs. The Kikuyu came to dominate the lower grades in Mombasa Municipal Council's staff by the 1970s and are also successful traders. The Luo moved from labouring jobs in the port and railway to management and trade union posts, and the Kamba have developed woodcarving businesses. These groups are reputed to be more successful in petty trade and manufacturing than coastal Africans. Tending to see the city as their own, the latter resent the success of migrant groups and characterize up-country people as more aggressive, unscrupulous and grasping than themselves. Up-country people, in turn, regard coastal people as unsophisticated, unprogressive and neither entrepreneurial nor hardworking. (24) The economic inequalities associated with tribal and ethnic heterogeneity have, thus, been a longstanding source of resentment on the part of poorer groups, fuelled by a political system (both national and local) which plays on tribal loyalties as a basis for support and reward.
These economic and ethnic rivalries have exacerbated the feelings of insecurity typically felt by residents of informal settlements in Kenya's urban areas and are regarded by the local population as relevant to the incidence and characteristics of poverty although, for the most part, residents originating from different parts of Kenya live in harmony and illfeeling surfaces only occasionally. Respondents of coastal origin in the participatory poverty assessment considered themselves to be more susceptible to poverty because up-country people are single migrants or have only small families to support, whilst up-country people felt that they were most vulnerable because they lacked the support of local kinship networks. Local people, especially young people, felt that managers in parastatals and large firms discriminated in favour of upcountry people from their own tribal groups and against local applicants although they regarded this as part of a larger problem of nepotism which has excluded those without patrons from formal sector jobs and government support to small enterprises. Reinforcing local people's feelings of 
IV. POLITICS, GOVERNMENT AND SERVICE PROVISION
THE BOUNDARIES OF Mombasa municipality are co-terminous with those of Mombasa district (see Map 1) and include the whole built-up area. Nevertheless, fragmented responsibilities, capacity constraints and limited room to manoeuvre because of the centralized political and administrative system reduce the efficacy of governmental arrangements.
a. Political Processes, Power and the Poor
Political processes in Mombasa are, first and foremost, a reflection of the political élite's competition for power at the national level. The wealth and resources commanded by individual contenders for power, the perceived capacity to influence or dispense patronage, tribal/ethnic identification and religion are the key social forces. The ethnic basis for politics in Coast province was established well before independence, as Mijikenda people and groups of Arab origin on the one hand, and upcountry groups and African Muslims on the other, supported rival political parties. From 1969 to 1991, Kenya was formally a single party state, under presidential authoritarian rule. During this period, political competition was largely confined to factions within the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). (26) During the 1992 and 1997 elections, four and seven main political parties, respectively, contended for power in Mombasa. In the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections, Daniel Arap Moi managed to garner only 35 and 40 per cent, respectively, of votes in the district. KANU won only one of the four Mombasa constituencies in 1992 and two in 1997. Turnout, though still low, increased from 37 to 42 per cent. In terms of the votes cast, KANU's level of support overall in Mombasa district did not change much, with about one-third of the votes in each parliamentary election, in spite of changes in the configuration of opposition parties and the politically instigated "tribal clashes" (see below). In the absence of ideological or policy differences, and with weak party organization, factionalism within parties and competition between them has, since the 1960s, been personalized. Electoral competition has drawn on and exacerbated national and local ethnic tensions related to land, access to central government resources and control over local resources for personal enrichment and patronage.
At the municipal level, councillors are elected from 24 wards. In addition, central government retains for itself the right to nominate an additional seven councillors. In 1992, KANU won 13 wards and, in 1997, 14 with the remainder split between a number of other parties. The nomination of additional KANU councillors by the central government has ensured an overall KANU majority throughout the 1990s. Writing of the 1992 elections, Southall and Ward commented that:
"The holding of civic elections in tandem with the presidential and parliamentary elections meant, almost inevitably, that issues of local government became almost wholly subordinated to the competition for power at national level. Worse, the implication was that those who were contesting seats for local government were fighting for the scraps left over by the bigger politicians, an impression heightened by the lack of attention focused upon local issues during the campaign." (27) The control of many municipalities by the opposition following both the 1992 and 1997 elections led the KANU government to weaken local authorities, including curtailing the activities of mayors. The retention of control over Mombasa Municipal Council by the ruling party has not exempted it from the longstanding efforts by central government to both reduce the autonomy of local government and force it to rely on locally generated revenue for service provision and administration. Nor has it been exempt from the volatile politics arising from intense factionalism within KANU, the intertwined nature of national and local politics, the ability of large-scale business to protect its own interests and widespread corruption. Two episodes illustrate the character of local politics.
First, elections in the 1990s have been accompanied by allegations of irregularities, corruption, intimidation and violence, continuing a pattern which has characterized politics in Mombasa since the late 1950s. (28) In particular, between August and December 1997, "tribal clashes" occurred, mostly in Likoni division in the southern part of the city (see Map 1), drawing on the simmering resentment between coastal people and migrants from other parts of the country. Allegedly bankrolled by KANU's Rashid Sajjad (see above in Section II), backed by Biwott (a Kalenjin and long-time aide of President Moi) and said to be instigated by some coastal people, the disturbances appeared to be intended to drive out up-country residents and small-scale entrepreneurs (potential supporters of opposition parties). The government and security forces seemed unwilling or unable to restore order. (29) Both large and small-scale businesses were adversely affected by the violence, especially tourism all along the coast and a large tuna processing factory employing more than 1,000 semi-skilled workers, including many women. Although specifically directed at the destruction of small businesses owned by up-country people, many local people's livelihoods were also adversely affected.
The second episode concerns the mayor elected following the 1997 elections. Mayors are elected by councillors and, in legislative terms, the position is an honorary one; but the dire state of local government and personal ambition has increasingly led mayors to adopt a more hands-on executive role, to the dismay of the central government. Mayors who demonstrate enthusiasm for reform have tended to be eased out of power through power struggles within their councils, be they members of KANU or of opposition parties. Najib Balala, a newly nominated KANU councillor of Arab origin and chairman of the Coast Tourist Association, took up office with the explicit intention of improving municipal administration, reducing corruption and "beautifying" the city. A number of short-term practical actions, especially improvements to refuse collection, rapidly increased his public profile and popularity despite other policies which favoured the large-scale tourist sector and penalized small businesses. During 1998, traders and curio sellers operating in the CBD were denied licences, their kiosks demolished and tourist circuits organized so that tourists spend little time walking around the city centre. However, Balala annoyed the powerful Sajjad by accusing him of having "grabbed" a plot of publicly owned land in a road reserve in 1994. (30) In early 1999, a vote of no confidence in the council forced Balala to resign despite widespread local protests. Replaced by his deputy, Mwahima, a coastal African, this coup was portrayed as a reaction to Arab domination by underprivileged coastal people. However, Sajjad, re-nominated as a national MP following the 1997 elections, had reportedly vowed to take action against Balala and was said to have had a hand, perhaps involving bribery, in mobilizing the vote of no confidence. (31) Nassir, the senior KANU elected MP in Mombasa, a supporter of Balala and himself of Arab origin, watched helplessly as Balala was thrown out of office. The Minister for Local Authorities made a half-hearted attempt to protect the mayor and then went silent, as did President Moi, after supporting him in 1998. This episode reveals power struggles within the coastal business élite, amongst whom protection of their business interests is the end, national political contacts and alliances the means and plays on ethnicity a convenient tool.
The poor are mere pawns in these quests for local and national political power, appealed to not on the basis of pro-poor policies, of which both national and local political campaigning is largely bereft, but on the basis of tribal loyalties, backed up by violence and intimidation.
b. Administration and Service Provision
The main organizations responsible for city governance in Mombasa are the municipal council (MMC) and the district (and provincial) offices of central government departments, under the control of their parent ministries and the district commissioner, an Office of the President appointee. The complex and often confused division of responsibilities is further complicated by the role of parastatals, including the National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation (NWCPC), the KPA, the Coast Development Authority and the Kenya Power and Lighting Corporation. Despite the existence of a coordinating mechanism, namely, the district development committee, rivalry and overlapping responsibilities between municipal and central government departments constrain efficient service provision. NGOs with potential influence on decisionmaking and welfare include not-for-profit organizations, business and commercial interest groups and, potentially, grassroots organizations of the poor. The service provision responsibilities of the MMC and district administration will be considered first, followed by a brief consideration of the NWCPC and NGOs.
The MMC has a mandate to provide primary education, public health and local roads, and also provides housing, markets and social welfare services as well as exercising regulatory functions relating to land use and building control, public health and business licensing. Its revenue comes mainly from property taxes (rates) (44 per cent in 1996-7), followed by service charges (a tax on employees and businesses) (19 per cent), market fees (10 per cent), house rents (10 per cent) and business licences (8 per cent). (32) It gets no recurrent support and little capital funding from government and is much poorer in real terms than it was 30 years ago. (33) In theory, the absence of any grant from central government means that the council has a high degree of discretion over spending decisions. In practice, the shortfall of revenue over expenditure needs, and the need to obtain central government approval for capital and revenue budgets, limit the council's discretion and also its ability to direct expenditure towards the poor. The lack of central government support, combined with poor financial management, means that the MMC is in an extremely poor financial condition, periodically unable to pay staff wages, unable to maintain its housing stock and unable to provide adequate services. In 1996/97, 20 per cent of its expenditure was devoted to health, 17 per cent to cleansing, 16 per cent to roads and lighting and 47 per cent to all other functions. Nursery schools, health services, refuse collection and housing are heavily subsidized. The latter, as we will see, does not benefit the poor. It is hard to assess who benefits from the other subsidies but they are likely, at least in part, to benefit poor people.
Primary and Pre-primary Education
In 1998, nearly 52,000 children were enrolled in Mombasa's 83 public primary schools and 16,000 in its 58 private primary schools. (34) With an enrolment rate of 70 per cent, this is lower than the national average (79 per cent) but higher than for Coast province as a whole (65 per cent). Although enrolment rates for boys and girls are the same, they vary between 85 per cent in Island division (the central part of the city) and 60 per cent in Likoni division in the south. This low and declining school attendance can be attributed both to the inadequate resources available and to rising costs which make it increasingly difficult for children from poor families to attend school. Teachers' salaries are paid directly by the national Teachers Service Commission (TSC). Charges for public primary schools are determined by their parent-teacher associations (PTA). Evidence from three schools in 1998/99 shows that charges include admission fees for new pupils, annual contributions to the PTA fund, private tuition fees, payments for books and/or examination fees. Of the low-income respondents in the participatory poverty assessment, 71 per cent considered that education was available but only 12 per cent that it was affordable. Sixty-seven per cent considered that the quality of provision had deteriorated since 1992 while only 11 per cent considered that there had been an improvement. Although, theoretically, the MMC is responsible for the "provision" of primary education, in practice it plays only a limited supervisory and advisory role. In addition, it provides 284 pre-primary or nursery schools in which, in 1997, nearly 21,000 children were enrolled. Muslim welfare organizations have put considerable effort into developing nursery schools associated with madrasa (Koranic schools linked to mosques), in order to improve the below average enrolment and completion rates of Muslim children.
A non-formal education programme was started in 1993, as part of a UNICEF funded programme, to provide some schooling to children who were not able to attend primary school. It was jointly implemented by MMC's Social Services Department and the Ministry of Social Services and Cultural Affairs' Adult Education Department, with the occasional opposition of MMC's Education Department which considers the tuition offered as second rate. In 1999, despite withdrawal of UNICEF support in 1995 when its Kenya country programme was suspended, 20 centres, with a total of 2,300 registered students, continue to operate. Ten per cent of the teachers are recruited and paid by the TSC and the Adult Education Department. The remainder are recruited from local communities, receive limited training and work on a semi-voluntary basis. Their honoraria are funded jointly by the MMC and parents, and the schools are run by community committees.
Public Health
MMC is responsible for primary health care, including basic curative care, preventive and promotive care, sanitation and cleansing. The district and provincial health departments of the Ministry of Health are responsible for secondary and tertiary facilities, but the district also operates primary facilities, leading to confusion and overlap.
The MMC runs 20 of the 115 health facilities in Mombasa and the central government 19, including the provincial and district hospitals. The remaining 76 are run by private, non-governmental and mission organizations. Despite population growth, only one clinic was built between 1994 and 1996 and the construction of an additional health centre in the 1997-2001 plan period is dependent on government or donor funding. (37) Although the municipal medical officer of health is appointed by the Ministry of Health, funds for municipal services are supposed to come from general revenue and, more recently, user fees. Services provided by the district Ministry of Health are funded from the national health budget. Shortages of qualified staff, especially in the municipal council, funding constraints and poor management have led to a deterioration in public sector services, exacerbated by the limited cooperation between the district and municipal health departments. Increased charges introduced to counteract the funding deficit have had a particularly severe impact on low-income residents. Asked, in 1996, whether health services were available, 60 per cent of a sample of poor households responded in the affirmative but 85 per cent considered them unaffordable. Seventy-three per cent thought that quality had deteriorated since 1992 and only 8 per cent that it had improved. (38) In part because of the poor quality of public services, private provision has increased in recent years but most of the services are beyond the reach of low-income residents.
Between 1989 and 1995, the shortfall in basic curative care and preventive and promotive services in low-income areas was addressed by a community-based health care programme supported by UNICEF. Training was provided for facilitators and trainers, mostly staff from the MMC public health department. Village health committees (VHCs) were established in a number of informal settlements and they in turn selected community health workers (CHWs). Grants were given to equip community pharmacies with a basic drug kit and a stock of impregnated mosquito nets. VHCs were expected to have accumulated sufficient income from initial sales to replenish the kits and to start income-generating activities to generate resources for an "incentive" to be paid to the CHWs. They were also expected to undertake preventive and promotive activities including malaria control, growth monitoring, facilitation of immunization programmes and sanitation improvements. Despite UNICEF withdrawal in 1995, some of the VHCs and pharmacies continue to operate. An evaluation found that the services they offer are valued by residents although it was not possible to measure outcomes or health impacts. It concluded that the basic concept of providing preventive programmes and first-stop curative care was workable. However, problems relating to accountability and community participation, financial sustainability, management support, medical and financial supervision, and health care practices would need to be solved if community-based health care is to adequately complement the primary health care services offered by public sector dispensaries and health centres. (39) Only 10 per cent of Mombasa's households are served by a conventional sewerage system. delayed extensions to the system and repairs to the non-functioning treatment works, with the result that untreated sewage runs into the sea. (41) About 18 per cent of households, as well as hotels and most public buildings, have septic tanks. (42) Most of the 13,000 septic tanks are in highincome areas but they are also widespread on the Island, even in highdensity areas. The cleansing section of the municipal health department (responsible for sanitation and solid waste management and, from early 1998, formed into a separate environment department) is responsible for septic tank emptying. In 1995, it had only one vacuum tanker so householders and private businesses rely on privately owned trucks or manual emptying. Of poor households surveyed in 1996, only 12 per cent had flush toilets. (43) The great majority of households (68 per cent in the mid-1990s and 81 per cent of poor households) used pit latrines. Of the 34,000 latrines, 5 per cent are on the Island in high-density areas, 15 per cent on the west mainland, 25 per cent on the south mainland and the remaining 55 per cent on the north mainland. (44) An officially sanctioned practice of digging latrines down to the water table has increased ground water pollution although, otherwise, latrines are relatively well-constructed and could easily be improved. They fill slowly and the relatively solid sludge is excavated by hand by licensed contractors. As the sewage works is not working, sludge from septic tanks and pit latrines is supposedly dumped at the main landfill. Not only is control lax and illegal dumping widespread but leachate from the creek side landfill also adds to seawater pollution.
The MMC is responsible for solid waste management but only 40 per cent of households had a regular waste collection service in 1993 (45) and only half the waste generated is collected because of supervisory staff and equipment shortages and charges which are well below costs. By the end of 1998, the council itself was only providing a service for the Island, a mixed-income area in which poor residents are sometimes excluded because of problems of access to their dwellings. It had privatized services in all the mainland areas. However, higher charges confined the services provided by private operators to high-income households and formal sector businesses, with many low-income households unable to afford the charges. In the absence of legal backing to ensure that private contractors collect from all households, and operating a cross-subsidy if appropriate, the MMC has had no option but to collect the refuse dumped along roadsides in low-income areas and informal settlements itself.
Water
Water for Mombasa south and north mainland divisions comes from boreholes and rivers in the districts of Kwale to the south and Kilifi to the north, respectively. The Island and west mainland are supplied by water piped from Mzima Springs in the Tsavo West national park. In 1992, supply was sufficient to meet only 39 per cent of demand. (46) The shortage is compounded by high rates of leakage from both the long distance pipelines and the city distribution network. In 1993, it was estimated that 29 per cent of households had their own connection. (47) Although the majority of households are said to "have access to" piped water, very few parts of the city receive a continuous supply and some have had no piped water for several years. On average, water is available 2.9 hours/day. (48) Although some informal settlements were provided with a basic piped supply during the UNICEF-funded programme, this is inadequate, forcing residents of poorly served areas to rely on water vendors or bore- holes managed by women's groups or mosque committees, despite the high level of groundwater contamination.
Of a sample of 182 poor households in 1996, 92 per cent experienced shortages, about half all the time and half occasionally. Asked to identify the main problems affecting their communities, water came first. Only 57 per cent of poor household heads considered that water was available and 55 per cent that it was affordable. Compared with five years previously, only 13 per cent thought that there had been an improvement and 53 per cent thought that the situation had deteriorated. (49) Negotiations between the water undertaker, the National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation and the World Bank over a loan for major improvements to water supply and distribution and sewerage have dragged on inconclusively, and current efforts centre on incremental improvements to supply, on the rehabilitation of distribution networks, the implementation of increased charges and improvements to pit latrines. (50) The outcome of these inadequate health, sanitation and water services, in terms of health status, can be suggested but poor data prevent detailed analysis. Morbidity is primarily due to malaria, acute respiratory infections and skin infections. Twenty-three per cent of men and 22 per cent of women experienced sickness in the two weeks prior to the welfare monitoring survey in 1994, reporting episodes of fever/malaria (50 per cent) and vomiting/diarrhoea (27 per cent). (51) Malaria is more prevalent in the outer, more rural parts of the district and cases of diarrhoea and skin complaints have increased since the late 1980s due to the continued deterioration of the water supply. (52) Life expectancy is slightly less than the national average, 58.6 years compared to 59.5. (53) The most recent figures provided by the MMC show an infant mortality rate of 93 per 1,000 live births in 1994 (54) and the incidence of malnutrition amongst children under the age of five was higher than the national average in both 1983 and 1994. (55)
Housing
Access to land and housing by the poor is discussed in Section V. Municipal policy has concentrated in the past on the construction of complete housing units for rent and the provision of serviced plots. The council currently has a stock of 1,600 single-room units, mostly occupied by its own low-income workers. Only 3 per cent of dwellings in 1989 were in municipal ownership and a further 7 per cent in government or parastatal ownership. (56) Sites and services schemes were implemented in the early 1980s, mainly in west mainland (see Map 1), with World Bank funding. The standards adopted, eligibility criteria (evidence of savings), bureaucratic procedures and shortfalls in funding for house loans excluded the poor or forced them to sell when they could not keep pace with construction and repayment requirements. In Chaani, a non-participatory approach, local authority malpractice and inefficiency, and lack of control over plot transfers has produced a mixed-income area, with a nearby unauthorized extension accommodating displaced occupiers and allottees as squatters or tenants. In addition, the requirements for rapid consolidation encouraged absentee landlordism and rent increases, to improve houses before the construction deadline and to repay loans. (57) c. Non-governmental and Civil Society Organizations
In the closed political system of the 1980s, political movements and civil society organizations were repressed although, given inadequate govern- 57. Macoloo, G C (1994), "The changing nature of ment capacity to fulfil developmental and service delivery functions, there was considerable growth in a welfare oriented NGO sector. There are perhaps 30 NGOs in Mombasa, as well as a few service organizations, and both Muslim and Christian religious organizations with welfare programmes. A few are large organizations, typically branches of international or national NGOs but most, especially the indigenous organizations, are small. They include a few with micro-credit programmes, currently on a small-scale, some concerned with women and/or children and a number concerned with health or environmental issues. Many are not directly concerned with urban poverty. Those which are attempt to reach the poor by locating in informal settlements and providing free or subsidized services but their programmes tend to be supply-led, smallscale and dependent on donations. An exception to the supply-led mode is ActionAid, which recently established an office in Mombasa and has, among other initiatives, started community development work in an informal settlement in north mainland. This programme is intended to address priority needs identified by residents and to develop communitybased organization.
Civil society organizations concerned with the protection and enhancement of political and legal rights include traditional organizations which survived the more repressive climate of the 1980s, such as the Dock Workers' Union. Although considering itself "the voice of the masses" employed by the KPA, the Union, in practice, concerns itself mainly with collective bargaining on behalf of permanent employees. Its freedom of action is limited and the interests of casual employees, who are ineligible for membership, outside its remit. (58) A newer civil society organization is Kituo cha Sheria (Public Law Institute), active in Mombasa since 1991, which provides, on a small scale, legal advice, education on legal rights and support for community-based organizations.
V. INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS: LAND, LIVING ENVIRONMENTS AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
THE TRADING LINKS of the past have left their mark not only on Mombasa's social and religious composition but also on its land tenure system. Arab, Swahili and Asian owners of both urban and rural land had, by the 1930s, been issued with freehold title, as had Digo farmers holding land near the town under customary tenure arrangements, with the need to "rationalize" informal landholding in areas ripe for urban development overcoming colonial officials' reluctance to issue freehold title to Africans. (59) Privately owned land was let, under the prevailing Sunni legal system, to "tenants-at-will" who, in practice, enjoyed considerable security of tenure and were entitled to take with them their houses and crops (or the equivalent in compensation) when required to leave.
Widespread private land ownership, followed by extensive sub-division on inheritance, has resulted, on the one hand, in a relatively small proportion of available land being in public ownership and, on the other, in a process of residential development based on informal but wellentrenched land rental followed by the construction of single-storey multi-room houses for rent. Since the 1920s, this system has been recognized, facilitated and, in theory, regulated by the local authority through a system of "village layouts" (sub-division for land rental, followed by construction of rooming houses from traditional construction materials). (60) In practice, development control has been ineffective and much sub-division and development is unauthorized. True squatting is limited but, since the 1960s, at least half the city's population has lived in informal settlements with varying degrees of official recognition and approval (see Map 1). The tenure arrangements vary between these areas and change over time, blurring distinctions between them. (61) They include: q "unofficial" allocation of government land to private individuals; q temporary occupation of private land with permission; q land originally occupied under customary tenure on which adjudication and issue of title is completed or in progress; q land allocated "temporarily" to specific groups of people, such as customary owners displaced by government projects, and occupied by their descendants. Temporary tenure was accompanied by restrictions on house improvement, although a presidential directive that residents in such areas should be given secure tenure is in the process of being implemented country-wide; q tenancy-at-will in privately owned areas, some with approved layouts. Many of the owners are absentee, living both elsewhere in Mombasa and abroad, and construction is increasingly with permanent materials although the regulations prohibit this.
Struggles over rights to land between occupiers and public or private owners continue. Poor residents are generally unable to access publicly owned land through the formal land administration system although, occasionally, they are able to squat on it, often by obtaining informal permission from government representatives acting like agents. (62) Such illegal occupation may later be regularized but settlers are also vulnerable to eviction. More likely is that access to land is obtained through the tenancy-at-will system, although this is increasingly commercialized and the majority of the poor are only able to rent rooms in this sub-market, at rents varying with distance from the CBD and quality of house construction.
Overall, the proportion of households in Mombasa who are owneroccupiers declined from 29 per cent in 1983 to 23 per cent in 1989 (63) and the vast majority of tenants rent within the private rental sector. The ample response of rental housing supply to demand is reflected in a relatively low rent to income ratio (estimated at 4.4 in Mombasa compared to 10.0 in Nairobi in 1995). (64) Thus, most of the poor live as tenants in informal settlements, with inadequate basic infrastructure and services, although many of the areas do not accommodate only the poor.
Organization in these settlements is dominated by the top-down control and security machinery of the district administration, namely, four appointed divisional officers, 12 chiefs and 18 sub-chiefs. The effectiveness of chiefs, and the degree to which they support community interests, varies. They, in turn, appoint leaders (elders, generally men), who may or may not have legitimacy in the eyes of residents. Some are respected and have considerable influence; they are relatively well-informed and used to being at the forefront of any development activity. However, they, as well as chiefs, may act as brokers, controlling outside inputs. They are used to exercising power by filtering information and directing communities. Residents, in turn, are used to them dominating community decision-making, even if their views and actions do not reflect the interests of the poor.
In most areas of the city, the mosque is central to community life, MOMBASA providing welfare services and Koranic education. Mosques and their activities are run by committees and sub-committees. In some areas, churches are also important foci of association. Committees are established for various purposes at settlement level, for example, to make demands on, or at the urging of, external agencies; for general development purposes; for regularization or for health. The committees (which generally include the elders) are not elected; instead, they are selected either by the chief and elders or at a baraza (community meeting). In addition to committees, and often not clearly distinguishable from them, are self-help groups, mostly of women or young people. Settlement level organization is patchy and weak and no systematic information is available on the number, composition and functions of existing committees although women, the poorest and tenants are probably under-represented in their membership. Most officials do not take CBOs seriously and even staff of the social services department of the MMC do not regularly come into contact with them unless they are seeking assistance for residents in particular difficulty or are popularizing a proposed project.
VI. TOWARDS PARTNERSHIP WITH THE POOR?
THE MANAGEMENT STYLE of central and local government alike tends to be sectoral, bureaucratic and top-down. Scope for positive developmental activity is limited by the institutional culture, the desire of central government to maintain control, shortages of senior staff and a lack of funds. Day-to-day activities focus on crisis management and a desperate struggle to maintain basic services, especially in the MMC. Overlapping responsibilities and rivalry between central and local government, with weak mechanisms for coordination, further reduces the effectiveness of service provision agencies. The district administration is merely a deconcentrated arm of central government with only weak accountability via four elected MPs. In theory, the MMC could run the city and be accountable to the electorate but, in practice, councillors are accountable to specific (often tribal or ethnic) groups to whom they have made campaign promises. These may or may not include the poor who are, in turn, weakened by the competition and resentment between ethnic and tribal groups which is exacerbated by nepotism and the playing out of competition between allied business and political interests at both national and local levels. In these circumstances, the needs of the poor are not pre-eminent although they do occasionally gain public sector attention, especially when external funding periodically becomes available. In addition, the programmes of government and NGOs alike tend to be supply-driven: there have been few attempts to respond to the expressed priority needs of poor people, let alone to involve them in planning and implementation. However, changing attitudes towards informal settlements, increasing understanding of the needs of poor residents and growing recognition that government can and should be neither the sole decision maker nor the direct provider of all services has recently led to the adoption of project planning processes which are more participatory and inclusive than in the past. For example, since 1997, a variety of public, political, private and NGO stakeholders have been involved in the planning of an environmental sanitation pilot project. (65) Also, a poverty reduction project prepared between 1996 and 1998, initially with UNCHS and then with UK Department for International Development support, has involved wide consultation with secondary stakeholders (central and local government departments, local politicians, NGOs and religious organizations) and some community representatives.
The local steering committee convened by the MMC to coordinate the planning process and project implementation arrangements incorporates central government departments and NGOs. Primary stakeholders were not involved during project planning because identification and selection of a suitable set of the poorest areas for inclusion in the project had to form part of the process. A dearth of project planning experience amongst those involved, a lack of understanding of demand-driven approaches to project design, overstretched mid-level and senior staff and mutual suspicion of each other's interests and motives resulted in occasionally tricky relationships and halting progress. Nevertheless, agreement was reached and a project eventually approved in early 1999. (66) The process produced closer working relationships between some public sector agencies and between public sector agencies and some NGOs, sectors which had previously rarely cooperated and between which there were low levels of trust.
The project will involve participatory methods of identifying needs, and action planning in five settlements, recognizing that the situation of households below the income poverty line, and indeed others living in the settlements concerned, is worsened by inadequate utility and service provision. It will strengthen grassroots organization and the involvement of settlement representatives in decision-making alongside government and NGOs. Considerable consultancy and training inputs have been incorporated to develop, first, a clear understanding of the intended collaborative, participatory and enabling approach amongst the politicians and organizations involved and, then, nascent relationships between them, changes in their mode of operation, shifts in attitudes and behaviour, and development of new knowledge and skills. (67) Inevitably, the development of new working relationships between and among the organizations representing the poor and service providers will be complex and slow, and may be conflictual. The aim is to build on the changes which have already occurred, to institutionalize more positive, sustainable and replicable approaches to meeting the needs of poor residents. Led by the MMC, implementation commenced in 1999. Nevertheless, any effective long-term prioritization of the needs of poor residents will not depend on the availability either of donor funds or of committed government and NGO staff but on the salience of poverty reduction activities to the unfolding of a political game in which ethnic rivalries, patronage and corruption are the tools used to advance the economic and political interests of the small groups controlling land, business and capital in the city.
